





The paper shows that any σ-transitive preference can be extended to
a complete preference preserving σ-transitivity. The result has poten-
tial applications to the theory of choice and speciﬁcally to revealed
preference theory.
JEL Classiﬁcation numbers: C60, D11, D70
1 Introduction
In his classical contribution Szpilrajn (1930) shows that any quasi-ordering
(a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation) can be extended to an ordering
(a complete quasi-ordering).1 The purpose of this paper is to provide an
analogous extension result for non-transitive preferences. The case of quasi-
transitivity (transitivity of the strict preference) is trivial since it suﬃces
to ‘complete’ the original preference by putting indiﬀerence for all pairs of
alternatives that are non-comparable. The focus of our analysis is a diﬀerent
∗Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Universit` a di Modena e Reggio Emilia, viale
Berengario 51, 41100 Modena, Italy.
1Strictly speaking Szpilrajn prooved a slightly diﬀerent result.
1notion of non-transitivity calledσ-transitivity and put forward by Sen (1970).
Our main result is an extension theorem which shows that any σ-transitive
preference can be extended to a complete preference preserving σ-transitivity.
We also provide the dual result in terms of a strict preference approach.
Finally, we show an application to the theory of choice by providing a new
characterization of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference.
2 Deﬁnitions and notation
Let X be an arbitrary set of alternatives. By S we denote a binary relation
in X, i.e. S ⊆ X2; we say that x ∈ X is related to y ∈ X and write (x,y) ∈ S
or, equivalently, xSy. Some of the most frequently used properties of binary
relations are stated below. A binary relation S in X is
Reﬂexive if xSx for all x ∈ X.
Irreﬂexive if ¬xSx for all x ∈ X.
Symmetric if xSy implies ySx.
Asymmetric if xSy implies ¬ySx.
Complete if for all x,y ∈ X either xSy or ySx or both.
Transitive if, for all x,y,z ∈ X, xSy and ySz imply xSz.
An irreﬂexive binary relation in X is called a strict preference and is
denoted by Q ⊆ X2. A strict preference can be seen as the union of two
disjoint components. By Qα ⊆ X2 we denote the asymmetric component of
Q, i.e. xQαy iﬀ xQy and ¬yQx. The symmetric component of Q is denoted
by E ⊆ X2, thus xEy iﬀ xQy and yQx. Clearly, Q = Qα∪E and Qα∩E = ∅.
When the strict preference Q is asymmetric the component E is empty.
From Q we derive the non-comparability relation N ⊆ X2 which is deﬁned
by xNy iﬀ ¬xQy and ¬yQx. Therefore, N is symmetric and non empty, since
by irreﬂexivity it contains the set ∆ := {(x,x) | x ∈ X}.
2By Q(x) we denote the upper contour set of Q, thus the set of strictly
preferred alternatives, i.e. Q(x)={z ∈ X | zQx}. On the other hand,
Q−1(x)={z ∈ X | xQz} is the lower contour set of Q, i.e. the set of
alternatives ‘dominated’ by x.
Let us introduce a few mild properties of transitivity.
Deﬁnition 1. Let Q be a strict preference.
Q is Superiorly Regular (SR) if, for all x,y ∈ X, xNy implies Q(x)=Q(y)
or, equivalently, if, for all x,y,z ∈ X, zQx and xNy imply zQy.
Q is Inferiorly Regular (IR) if, for all x,y ∈ X, xNy implies Q−1(x)=
Q−1(y) or, equivalently, if, for all x,y,z ∈ X, zNx and xQy imply
zQy.
We notice that either SR or IR imply transitivity of the non comparability
relation N, i.e. if xNy and yNz then xNz. However, SR and IR do not imply
transitivity of Q.
A non irreﬂexive binary relation in X is a weak preference or, simply,
a preference, and will be denoted by R ⊆ X2. The asymmetric and the
symmetric components of a preference R are respectively denoted by Rα
and Rσ, i.e. xRαy iﬀ xRy and ¬yRx, and xRσy iﬀ xRy and yRx. Clearly,
R = Rα∪Rσ and Rα∩Rσ = ∅. The following deﬁnitions have been introduced
by Sen (1970)
Deﬁnition 2. The preference R is
i) ασ-transitive if zRαx and xRσy imply zRαy
ii) σα-transitive if zRσx and xRαy imply zRαy
iii) σσ-transitive if zRσx and xRσy imply zRσy
iv) σ-transitive if (i), (ii) and (iii) hold.
Notice that σ-transitivity does not imply transitivity of R.
3In this paper we use both the strict and the weak preference approach. As
it is well known,2 they are intimately related by the following relationship. A
given strict preference Q generates the weak preference R as follows: xRy iﬀ
¬yQx. Equivalently, R can be deﬁned by R = X2 − Q−1 where Q−1 :=
{(x,y) ∈ X2 | (y,x) ∈ Q} is the inverse relation of Q. Starting from
a reﬂexive weak preference R, we can generate in a similar way a strict
preference Q. We say that R and Q are conjugate preferences.
A subrelation of a given strict preference S is a strict preference Q satis-
fying Q ⊆ S and Sα ⊆ Qα. Similarly, an extension of a given preference S is
a preference R satisfying Sα ⊆ Rα and Sσ ⊆ Rσ.
3 A preliminary result
Given a SR strict preference Q we propose a general method for constructing
a subrelation P ⊆ Q which is asymmetric and preserves the SR property. As
we will see, this result also applies to the case of weak preferences and allows
us to obtain a complete σ-transitive extension.
The construction of the desired subrelation P may seem a trivial mat-
ter. In fact, if we select ‘one half’ of the symmetric component E, i.e. an
asymmetric set E∗ such that E∗ ∪ E∗−1 = E, we immediately obtain the
asymmetric subrelation P = Qα ∪ E∗. However, P need not preserve the SR
property. Take the following simple example.
Example. Let X = {x,y,z} and Q = {(x,z),(z,x),(y,z),(z,y)}. Then
Qα = ∅, E = Q and N = {(x,y),(y,x)}∪∆. Clearly, Q has the SR
property and is not asymmetric. Let us consider the asymmetric relation
E∗ = {(x,z),(z,y)}. Then E∗ ∪ E∗−1 = E and the subrelation P = E∗ is
asymmetric. However, P has not the SR property since xNy, z ∈ P(y) but
z 6∈ P(x). In this trivial example it is easy to ﬁnd a subrelation P which
fulﬁlls the desired requirements; take, for instance, E∗ = {(z,x),(z,y)}.I n
general, however, things are not so simple especially when the number of
alternatives is not ﬁnite.
2See Section 6 in Kim and Richter (1986).
4All over the present section, we assume that Q = Qα ∪ E is a strict
preference satisfying the SR property. The aim of the present paper is to
devise a general method for splitting the symmetric component E of the
strict preference by preserving the SR property. A few useful facts deriving
from SR and concerning the symmetric component of the strict preference
are stated below.
Fact 1. (z,y) ∈ E if and only if there exists (x,w) ∈ X2 such that (z,y)




Indeed, (1) and SR imply (z,y) ∈ E. Conversely, (1) trivially holds for x = y
and w = z.
The relationships between x and w satisfying (1) are characterized by the
following fact.
Fact 2. If (z,y) ∈ E and (x,w) ∈ X2 satisfy (1) there are only three possible
mutually exclusive cases:
i) wQαx iﬀ zQαx
ii) xQαw iﬀ yQαw
iii) wEx.
Proof. Obviously, the three cases are mutually exclusive. To prove that they
exhaust all the possibilities we must show that xNw is excluded. Indeed,
by transitivity of N, wNz would imply xNz which is impossible since zQx.
Next, let us consider the equivalence in (i) and suppose that xQz. Then
from zNw and SR we have xQw which contradicts wQαx, thus zQαx. The
converse and the equivalence in (ii) are proved in a similar way. ￿
As we mentioned before, the construction of an asymmetric subrelation
of Q requires a careful analysis of the set E. In particular, we are looking for
an asymmetric subset of E. The ﬁrst step is given by the following deﬁnition.
5Deﬁnition 3. The set E∗
1 ⊆ X2 is deﬁned as follows: (z,y) ∈ E∗
1 if (z,y) ∈ E
and for some (x,w) ∈ X2 satisfying (1) it holds zQαx.
As required the relation E∗
1 is asymmetric. To check this claim let us
suppose that both (z,y) ∈ E∗
1 and (y,z) ∈ E∗
1, then there exist (x,w),
(x0,w 0) ∈ X2 such that (i) (z,y) and (x,w) satisfy (1) with zQαx and (ii)
(z,y) and (x0,w 0) satisfy (1) with yQαw0. But, since then (z,y) and (x,w0)
would satisfy (1), by Fact 2, zQαx and yQαw0 cannot hold together and this
contradiction establish our claim.
Other potential elements of the symmetric component E are collected in
the set E2 ⊆ X2 deﬁned as follows:
(z,y) ∈ E2 if (z,y) ∈ E and for all (x,w) ∈ X2 satisfying (1) it holds xEw.
Clearly E2 is symmetric and its intersection with E∗
1 is empty. The next
step in the construction of the desired subrelation consists in selecting an
appropriate subset of E2. To this aim we introduce a new family of subsets
of E2:
Let (z,y) ∈ E2; The set G(z,y) consists of all (x,w) ∈ X2 satisfying (1).
It is easily veriﬁed that (y,z) ∈ G(z,y) so that the sets G(z,y) are not empty.
Other useful properties are stated below.
Lemma 1. The set G(z,y) has the following properties:
i) G(z,y) ⊆ E2.
ii) G(z,y) is asymmetric.
iii) G(y,z)=G(z,y)−1 := {(w,x) ∈ X2 | (x,w) ∈ G(z,y)}.
iv) If (x,w) ∈ G(z,y) then G(z,y)=G(z,x).
The proof is the Appendix.
The sets G(z,y) allow us to obtain a partition of E2.







6It is easily seen that R is an equivalence relation, i.e. it is reﬂexive,
symmetric and transitive, therefore E2 can be partitioned into equivalence
classes. We denote by C the family of equivalence classes and by C a generic
element of C, thus E2 = ∪C∈CC and C ∩ C0 = ∅ for all C 6= C0.
Lemma 2. The set E2 is partitioned into equivalence classes by the binary
relation R. Any equivalence class C ∈Chas the following properties: (i) C is
an asymmetric subset of E2 and (ii) the set C−1 = {(z,y) ∈ E2 | (y,z) ∈ C}
is an equivalence class in E2, i.e. if C ∈Cthen C−1 ∈C .
The proof is in the Appendix.
The above construction allows us to split in a suitable way the set E2.
Indeed, according to Lemma 2, C can be partitioned by the family of sets
{C,C−1}. By the Axiom of Choice, then there exists a subset D⊆Cwith
the following property: if C ∈Cthen either C ∈Dor C−1 ∈D , but not
both.
Lemma 3. Let E∗
2 := ∪C∈DC. The set E∗
2 is an asymmetric subset of E2.
The proof of Lemma 3 follows easily from the deﬁnition of D and Lemma
2.
We are ready for the ﬁnal step of our construction.
Proposition 1. Let E ⊆ X2 be the symmetric component of a strict pref-








1 is as in Deﬁnition 3 and E∗
2 as in Lemma 3. The set E∗ is asym-
metric and satisﬁes the condition E∗ ∪ E∗−1 = E.
The proof is in the Appendix.
It may be useful to illustrate our construction by means of the example
discussed at the beginning of this section.
Example (continued). Since Qα = ∅, by Deﬁnition 3, also E∗
1 is empty.
On the other hand, it is easy to check that (z,y) and (z,x) are in E2, so that
7by symmetry of E2 we have E2 = E = Q. With the help of Lemma 1 we can
also compute the sets G.
G(z,y)={(x,z),(y,z)} G(y,z)={(z,x),(z,y)}
G(z,x)={(x,z),(y,z)} G(x,z)={(z,x),(z,y)}
Thus, we have (z,y)R(z,x) and (y,z)R(x,z), and the equivalence classes are
C = {C,C0} where
C = {(z,x),(z,y)} and C
0 = {(x,z),(y,z)}
We can set D = {C}, therefore, E∗
2 = C and, ﬁnally, E∗ = E∗
1∪E∗
2 = ∅∪C =
{(z,x),(z,y)}, which is the solution proposed in the example.
We notice that the construction proposed in Proposition 1 works when
the set of alternative X is ﬁnite as well as when it is inﬁnite. However, only
in the latter case we are forced to resort to the Axiom of Choice.
4 The main result
In this section we show that the set E∗ actually serves the purpose of ﬁnding
the desired asymmetric subrelation of Q.
Theorem 1. Let Q be a strict preference satisfying the SR property. Then
there exists a strict preference P with the following properties:
i) P is an asymmetric subrelation of Q, i.e. P ∩ P −1 = ∅, P ⊆ Q and
Qα ⊆ P.
ii) P has the SR and IR properties.
Proof. Set P = Qα ∪ E∗ where E∗ is given by (2). Then (i) follows trivially
from Proposition 1.
As for (ii), let us suppose that P does not satisfy the SR property, i.e.
there exist x, y and z such that xNy, z ∈ P(x) and z 6∈ P(y). Since P ⊆ Q
and z ∈ P(x)w eh a v e( z,x) ∈ Q and by SR of Q it must be (z,y) ∈ Q.
8Thus, since (z,y) 6∈ P it must be (z,y) ∈ E and speciﬁcally (z,y) ∈ E∗−1 or
equivalently (y,z) ∈ E∗. We will show that this leads to a contradiction.
Let us suppose that (y,z) ∈ E∗
1, so that there exists w ∈ X such that
yQαw and wNz. Thus, we can write
yQαw, wNz
zQx, xNy
By Fact 2(ii) we have xQαw and it is easily seen that (x,z) ∈ E∗
1. Thus
x ∈ P(z), which is impossible since z ∈ P(x) and P is asymmetric. Therefore,
we conclude that (y,z) 6∈ E∗
1.
Next, let us suppose that (y,z) ∈ E∗
2 so that (y,z) belongs to an equiva-
lence class, i.e. (y,z) ∈ C for some C ∈C . Moreover, since (y,z) ∈ E2 and
(z,x) satisfy (1), by Lemma A (in the Appendix), we also have (x,z) ∈ E2.
We show that (x,z) ∈ C, i.e. G(y,z)=G(x,z).
By symmetry of E2,( y,z) ∈ E2 implies (z,y) ∈ E2, thus there exists
w ∈ X such that (x,w) ∈ G(z,y). Then by Lemma 1(iv), G(z,y)=G(z,x),
so that G(z,y)−1 = G(z,x)−1 and by Lemma 1(iii) G(y,z)=G(x,z). Since
(y,z) and (x,z) belong to the same equivalence class C and (y,z) ∈ E∗
2,w e
also have (x,z) ∈ E∗
2. But that means x ∈ P(z), which is impossible since
P is asymmetric and z ∈ P(x) by assumption. Hence (y,z) 6∈ E∗
2 and we
conclude that P has the SR property.
To complete point (ii) we show that an asymmetric and SR preference
is also IR. Indeed, let us suppose that IR is violated, i.e. there exist xNy,
xPz and ¬yPz. We have two cases: (a) zPy, then SR yields zPx which is
impossible since P is asymmetric. (b) ¬zPy, so that zNy and since xPz,
SR yields xPy which is impossible since xNy. Thus we conclude that P is
also IR.
￿
The Extension Theorem is the dual of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2.(Extension Theorem) Let S be a reﬂexive and σ-transitive
binary relation. Then there exists a reﬂexive preference R with the following
properties:
i) R is complete, i.e. R ∪ R−1 = X2.
9ii) R is an extension of S, i.e. Sα ⊆ Rα and Sσ ⊆ Rσ.
ii) R is σ-transitive.
Proof. Let us set Q = X2 − S−1 or equivalently deﬁne Q by xQy iﬀ x 6= y
and ¬ySx. By reﬂexivity of S, the relation Q is irreﬂexive. Let us suppose
that Q is not SR, i.e. there exist x,y and z such that xNy, zQx and ¬zQy.
By deﬁnition of Q and by z 6= y we have yRz. In addition, xNy means xRσy
so that by σ-transitivity we have xRz which contradicts zQx. Hence Q is
SR.
By Theorem 1 there exists an asymmetric SR subrelation P = Qα∪E∗ =
Sα ∪ E∗. Taking the complement of P −1 we obtain the reﬂexive preference
R = X2 − P −1, equivalently deﬁned by xRy iﬀ ¬yPx. By asymmetry of
P the preference R is complete. Moreover, Rα = P = Sα ∪ E∗ ⊇ Sα and
Rσ = Sσ. Thus R is an extension of S. It is not diﬃcult to check that
R has the desired property of σ-transitivity. For instance, let us consider
σα-transitivity and suppose xRσy, yRαz but ¬xRαz. In terms of the strict
preference P we have xNy, yPz and ¬xPz, which violate IR of P.
￿
Theorem 1 and 2 do not place any requirement on the algebric or topolog-
ical structure of the set of alternatives, therefore they provide quite abstract
and general results. An interesting application is discussed in the next sec-
tion.
5 An application
In this ﬁnal section of the paper we illustrate our result with an application
to the theory of choice and speciﬁcally to revealed preference theory. To
begin with, let us introduce some more notation.
Let A be the set of all the subsets of X and B any nonempty subset of
A which does not contain the empty set. A function Φ: B→Ais a choice
if Φ(B) ⊆ B for all B ∈B . Φ is single-valued if Φ(B) is a singleton for all
10B ∈B . Following Richter (1966), a preference R is said to rationalize the
choice function Φ if for all B ∈B
Φ(B)={x ∈ B | xRy for all y ∈ B}.
A choice function Φ is rational if there exists some preference R satisfying
the above condition. A strict preference Q motivates the choice function Φ
if for all B ∈B
Φ(B)={x ∈ B | Q(x) ∩ B = ∅}.
Φ is motivated if there exists some strict preference Q satisfying the above
condition.
A choice function Φ generates a revealed preference relation, that is a
binary relation V ⊆ X2, which is deﬁned by xV y iﬀ there exists B ∈B
such that x ∈ Φ(B) and y ∈ B, in words, x is revealed preferred to y if y is
available when x is chosen. The revealed strict preference V ∗ is deﬁned by
xV ∗y iﬀ there exists B ∈Bsuch that x ∈ Φ(B) and y ∈ [B−Φ(B)] (i.e. y is
rejected when x is chosen). Samuelson (1938) introduced the Weak Axiom
of Revealed Preference (WARP) as a criterion of consistency of choice.
The choice function Φ: B→Asatisﬁes WARP iﬀ xV ∗y implies ¬yVx.
As an application of our Extension Theorem we obtain a new characterization
of WARP.
Proposition 2. Let Φ be a single-valued choice. The following statements
are equivalent:
i) Φ satisﬁes the WA
ii) Φ is rationalized by a reﬂexive and σ-transitive preference S
iii) Φ is motivated by a SR and IR strict preference Q
iv) Φ is motivated by an asymmetric SR and IR strict preference P
v) Φ is rationalized by a complete, σ-transitive preference R
Proof. (i) to (ii). It is well known that a choice satisfying the WARP is
rationalized by the revealed preference V . Moreover, since Φ is single-valued
11V is antisymmetric, i.e. xV y and yVx imply x = y. Thus V σ ⊆ ∆=
{(x,y) ∈ X2 | x = y} and V is trivially σ-transitive. Hence S = V ∪ ∆i s
reﬂexive, σ-transitive and rationalizes Φ.
(ii) to (iii). Set Q = X2−S−1, i.e. xQy iﬀ x 6= y and ¬ySx. Clearly, Q is
irreﬂexive and using a similar argument as that used in the proof of Theorem
1.(ii) one easily shows that Q is also SR and IR.
Next, we show that Q motivates Φ. It is easily seen that Φ(B) ⊆ Ψ(B)=
{x ∈ B | Q(x) ∩ B = ∅} for all B ∈B . To show the converse let us suppose
that x ∈ Ψ(B) and x 6∈ Φ(B) for some B. By deﬁnition of Ψ we have ¬yQx
for all y ∈ B and, for y 6= x we have xSy. Since x 6∈ Φ(B) it must be ¬xSx,
which contradicts reﬂexivity of S.
(iii) to (iv). By Theorem 1 the desired strict preference P can be obtained
from Q. Next we show that P motivates Φ. Let Ψ(B)={x ∈ B ; P(x)∩B =
∅}. Since Φ is motivated by Q and P(x) ⊆ Q(x), it is easily seen that
Φ(B) ⊆ Ψ(B). To show the converse let x ∈ Ψ(B) so that P(x) ∩ B = ∅.
Arguing by contradiction, let us suppose that x 6∈ Φ(B), which means that
there exists z such that z ∈ Q(x)∩ B. Since Φ(B) is not empty, there exists
y 6= x such that y ∈ Φ(B), thus y ∈ Ψ(B) since P(x) ⊆ Q(x). Clearly, x and
y are non comparable under P and, by (ii), also under Q, i.e. xNy. However,
since Q has the SR property and zQx, it must be zQy so that z ∈ Q(y)∩ B
and y cannot be in Φ(B). Therefore, we conclude that P motivates Φ.
(iv) to (v). By the same argument used in the proof of the Extension
Theorem we obtain the required preference R. Moreover, since R is the
conjugate preference of P it rationalizes the same choice function motivated
by P (see Kim and Richter (1986), Lemma 5).
(v) to (i). Let us suppose that Φ violates WARP, i.e. there exist x and y
such that xV ∗y and yVx. From xV ∗y, there exists B such that x ∈ Φ(B) and
y ∈ B−Φ(B). Since R rationalizes Φ we must have xRy and for some z ∈ B,
zRαy. Moreover, from yVx we have yRx, so that yRσx.B yσ-transistivity
of R we have zRαx, but then R cannot rationalize Φ.
￿
The characterization of WARP by (ii) and (iii) are respectively due to
Clark (1988) and Scapparone (2000). The last two characterizations, (iv)
12and (v), are new and are obtained as applications of the extension results.
Appendix
Lemma A. If (z,y) ∈ E2 and (x,w) satisﬁes (1) then (x,w), (z,x) and
(y,w) are in E2.
Proof. Let us ﬁrst show that (z,x) ∈ E2. By (1) we have zQx and by
(z,y) ∈ E2 we have xEw. Thus, by SR, xQw and wNz yield xQz. Thus
(z,x) is in E.
Let (z,x) and (x0,w 0) ∈ X2 satisfy conditions (1), i.e.
zQx0,x 0Nx
xQw0,w 0Nz
If w0Qαx0 then, by Fact 2, zQαx0. Noting that, by SR, x0Nx and xNy yield
x0Ny we see that (z,y) and (x0,w) satisfy (1) so that (z,y) ∈ E∗
1 which
contradicts (z,y) ∈ E2.
Next, let us suppose that x0Qαw0. Then, by Fact 2, xQαw0 and it is
easily seen that (x,z) and (w0,y) satisfy (1). By Fact 2 and xQαw0 we then
have yQαw0, therefore (y,z) and (w0,x) satisfy (1) and (y,z) ∈ E∗
1. But this
contradicts (z,y) ∈ E2 since E2 is symmetric and E∗
1 and E2 are disjoint.
Thus, by Fact 2, we conclude that for all (x0,w 0) it must be x0Ew0 so that
(z.x) ∈ E2.
The remaining two cases are shown similarly. For example, notice that
(x,z) ∈ E2 and (w,y) satisfy (1) so that, as shown above, (x,w) ∈ E2. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) (x,w) ∈ G(z,y) implies, by Lemma A, that (x,w) ∈ E2.
(ii) Let (x,w) ∈ G(z,y) then, by Deﬁnition 5, wNz.I f( w,x) is in G(z,y)
then zQw which contradicts wNz.
(iii) We have to show that (x,w) ∈ G(z,y)i ﬀ( w,x) ∈ G(y,z). This
follows trivially from (1).
(iv) By Lemma A, (z,x) ∈ E2 thus G(z,x) is well deﬁned. First, we show
that G(z,y) ⊆ G(z,x).
13Let (x0,w 0) ∈ G(z,y), i.e. (z,y) and (x0,w 0) satisfy conditions (1) so that
we have zQx0. Moreover, x0Nx follows from SR, x0Ny and yNx. Next, it is
easily seen that (z,y) and (x,w0) satisfy (1), therefore we have w0Nz and, by
Lemma A, xQw0. Hence (z,x) and (x0,w 0) satisfy (1) and we conclude that
(x0,w 0) ∈ G(z,x).
The inclusion G(z,x) ⊆ G(z,y) is shown in a similar way. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) If (z,y) and (y,z) are in the same equivalence class we have G(z,y)=
G(y,z). Then, by Lemma 1(iii), G(z,y)=G(z,y)−1, which is impossible
since G(z,y) is asymmetric and non empty.
(ii) Let (z,y) ∈ C. By (i), C is asymmetric thus (y,z) 6∈ C. Therefore
(y,z) ∈ C0 for some C0 ∈Cwith C0 6= C. We have to show that C0 = C−1.
Now, let (y0,z0) ∈ C0. Thus G(y,z)=G(y0,z0) so that G(y,z)−1 = G(y0,z0)−1
and, by Lemma 1(iii), G(z,y)=G(z0,y0). Hence (z0,y0) ∈ C and (y0,z0) ∈
C−1. Therefore, we have shown that C0 ⊆ C−1. The converse is also true
and is proved similarly. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let (z,y) ∈ E∗ and (y,z) ∈ E∗. As we know, E∗
1 and E∗
2 are asymmetric
thus (z,y) ∈ E∗
1 and (y,z) ∈ E∗
2 (or vice versa). Since (y,z) ∈ E∗
2 we also
have (z,y) ∈ E2, which is impossible since E∗
1 and E2 are disjoint.
Next, we show that E ⊆ E∗ ∪ E∗−1. Let (z,y) ∈ E, then by Fact 1 and
2 we have the following cases:
(a) For some (x,w) ∈ X2 satisfying (1) it holds xQαw. Then, by Deﬁni-
tion 4, (z,y) ∈ E∗
1 ⊆ E∗ ∪ E∗−1.
(b) For some (x,w) ∈ X2 satisfying (1) it holds wQαx. Then, by Deﬁni-
tion 4, (y,z) ∈ E∗
1 thus (z,y) ∈ E
∗−1
1 ⊆ E∗ ∪ E∗−1.
(c) Finally, for all (x,w) ∈ X2 satisfying (1) it holds xEw. Then, by
Deﬁnition 4, (z,y) ∈ E2 and, by Remark 3, E2 ⊆ E∗ ∪ E∗−1.
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